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FOREWORD: THE USE AND CONTROL OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
DAVID

G.

OWENt

I.
Punitive damages are on the march. Almost overnight, they
seemed to spring from nowhere onto center stage in private litigation of virtually every type.' In the very recent past, punitive
damages have spread into more and more corners of civil litigation, such as admiralty, 2 insurer bad faith, 3 business torts of various types,4 drunk driving, 5 and professional malpractice, 6 to name
only a few.
Perhaps the area of tort litigation most pervasively affected by
the spread of punitive damages is products liability.7 Punitive
t Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
The author would like to acknowledge that his colleagues, Pat Hubbard and Dennis
Nolan, were of no help whatsoever in the preparation of this Foreword.
1. See, e.g., Schwartz, Deterrence andPumshment in the Common Law ofPunitive Damages. A
Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 133 (1982) ("[punitive damages] are now dramatically
awarded in cases in which liability of any sort would have been almost out of the question
merely fifteen years ago"). See generally Symposum: Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1982) (analysis of fairness and efficiency of punitive damages) [hereinafter cited as
Symposiuml.
2. See, e.g., Dyer v. Merry Shipping Co., 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1981) (punitive damages may be recovered under general maritime law for willful and wanton creation or
maintenance of unseaworthy conditions).
3. See, e.g., Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr.
389 (1978) (punitive damages may be awarded where insurer acts with oppression in denying its insured a reasonable settlement).
4. See, e.g., Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981) (stockbroker
"churned" client's account).
5. See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr.
693 (1979) ("conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences" of drunk driving may constitute "malice" and warrant punitive damages).
6. Nelson v. Gaunt, 125 Cal. App. 3d 623, 178 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1981) (doctor knowingly administered illegal medical procedure).
7. Among the considerable writing on this aspect of the topic, I am most familiar
with Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products,
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Problems]; and Owen, Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Punitive
Damages]. A helpful, more recent article is Seltzer, Punilive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation.
Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Ejfiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (1983); see
also Meyers & Barrus, Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability Cases. A Survey, 51 INS. COUNS. J.
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damages verdicts for large amounts have been rendered or upheld
in the very recent past in a variety of products liability contexts:
$6 million in one Dalkon Shield case,8 $500,000 in another; 9 $2.75
million in an oral contraceptive failure to warn case;' 0 $8 million
in one Mustang II fuel tank case," $100 million in another;'2 and
$25 million for a defective pilot's seat in a small airplane.' 3 Nor
will the asbestos industry, especially Johns-Manville, be seeing the
end of punitive damages verdicts any time soon. 14 And lawyers
representing the chemical and pharmaceutical industries in the
mid-1980's must be seriously concerned over the prospect that punitive damages will spread broadly into the fields of toxic chemical
and drug litigation. Punitive damages are thus in the forefront of
modern tort litigation, and the bench and bar have a vital need for
elucidation of this crucial topic.
II.
The three articles in this Symposium serve this need well. Gary
Haugen and Howard Tarkow's article, Punitive Damages in Minnesota." The Common Law and Developments Under Section 549.20 of the

Minnesota Statutes,' 5 provides an excellent roadmap for the lawyer
trying to structure his case under the statutory and common law of
Minnesota. The article by Judge Donald Alsop and David Herr,

Punitive Damages in Minnesota Products Liability Cases.- A JudicialPer-

spective,' 6 presents a particularly insightful outline of the case management problems posed by punitive damages at the various
procedural steps in the litigation of such a case. Finally, in The
Discovery and Proofof a Punitive Damages Claim.- Strategy Decisions and
212 (1984) (survey of recoverability of punitive damages in products liability cases by
jurisdiction).
8. Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., - Colo. -, 684 P.2d 187 (1984).
9. Worsham v. A.H. Robins Co., 734 F.2d 676 (11th Cir. 1984).
10. Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 235 Kan. 387, 681 P.2d 1038 (1984).
11. Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, - Ga. App. -, 319 S.E.2d 470 (1984).
12. The trial court remitted the verdict to $20 million. See Walsh, Fiig of Punitive
Damages Claim Is Focus of Increasing Controversy, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1984, at 27, col. 4.
13. Guarnere v. Harper, Civ. No. 80-3285 (D.N.J. June 8, 1984) (verdict against
Cessna Aircraft Co.), cited in 4 VERDICTS & SETTLEMENTS 417 (Sept. 1984).
14. See, e.g., Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984);
Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corps., 193 N.J. Super. 113, 472 A.2d 577 (App. Div. 1984).
15. Haugen & Tarkow, Puitive Damages in Mnnesota. The Common Law and Developments
Under Section 549.20 of the Minnesota Statutes, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REx'. 353 (1985).
16. Alsop & Herr, Punitive Damages in Minnesota Products Liability Cases: A judicial Perspective, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 319 (1985).
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17
Pretrial Tactics When Representing the Platiff,
Dale Larson and
Robert Wattson forcefully present the plaintiff's case favoring such
damages, and examine a number of important strategic issues
unique to punitive damages claims.
The Haugen and Tarkow article first examines the two principal functions of punitive damages at common law-punishment
and deterrence. The relevance of the defendant's financial condition is considered in this context, as are the effect in such an action
of the death of the defendant, or of the plaintiff, and the Eisert'8
decision's rejection of punitive damages in strict products liability
property damage actions. The remainder of the article examines
five key issues under the statute: (1) jurisdictional issues, including
the preclusion of punitive damages claims in contracts actions, further discussion of the strict liability property loss exception of
Eisert, and the legislative resolution of the wrongful death issue;
(2) the "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof, and its
effect of increasing judicial control; (3) the "willful indifference to
the rights or safety of others" statutory standard for punitive damages liability; (4) the statutory factors for determining the amount
of such damages; and (5) the liability for punitive damages of principals generally, and municipalities in particular, for the misconduct of their agents.
The Alsop and Herr article works from the premise that punitive damages claims raise "a significant risk of an excessive or
otherwise errant verdict," thereby requiring greater judicial control throughout the management of the case. 19 The authors point
out that strict judicial control has been mandated by both the
Minnesota Legislature and the Minnesota Supreme Court, and
that the manner in which a judge will exercise that control will
often be guided in large part by the court's early "impression" of
the strength of the punitive damages claim. The authors next examine special problems raised by the punitive claim during the
early stages of the case, including questions involving motions to
dismiss, summary judgment, class action certification, consolidation, impleader and joinder of third parties, and the implications
for settlement-and bad faith claims-if the defendant is insured.
Discovery problems concerning the defendant's wealth are next

17. Larson & Wattson, The Dicovey and Pof ofa Punitive Damages Claim: Strategp Decisions and Pretrial Tactis When Representing the Plainti, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 395
(1985).
18. Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 1982).
19. Alsop & Herr, supra note 16, at 320.
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discussed, after which the authors consider final pretrial issues
such as motions in limine, limiting experts, and bifurcation.
Among the trial issues examined are the reference to punitive
damages in opening statements and final argument, various evidentiary considerations, and cautionary instructions. Finally, the
authors discuss verdict forms, the risk of inconsistent verdicts, the
importance of a clear and specific jury charge, the standard of
proof, and the use of remittitur. The authors conclude the article
by returning once again to their theme-that the courts must
manage cases involving punitive damages claims with strict
control.
The Larson and Wattson article looks at punitive damages from
the plaintiff's perspective, and highlights many of the various strategic choices that arise when a punitive damages claim is in the
case. The authors begin by arguing the importance of punitive
damages in restraining corporate malfeasance, and consider some
practical problems in that regard. They then focus on a variety of
strategic considerations, such as the difficult question of whether a
plaintiff should assert a punitive claim at all, and risk the possibility of reversal or remittitur, or instead should make the culpability
case in negligence and push for an inflated "compensatory" award
which the court may be more reluctant to reduce. The authors
next consider several thorny implications on settlement strategy if
the defendant carries liability insurance, and in this context examine the conflict problem between the insurer and insured, and
the resulting risk of bad faith failure to settle claims. Then they
examine certain discovery problems involving claims of work
product privilege, the importance of discovering records of product testing, documentary evidence of internal corporate criticism,
and records pertaining to similar accidents. The authors conclude
with some suggestions for dealing with pretrial motions by defendants, dealing with such matters as protective orders, bifurcation,
remedial measure evidence exclusion, and partial summary
judgment.
III.

Ever since punitive damages emerged from the primordial
ooze, 20 courts and commentators have had an ambivalent, love20. For the historical development of punitive damages, see Ellis, Fainessand EftiencY
'n the Law ofPuniti've Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1982), Punitive Damages, supra note 7, at
1262-64.
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hate relationship with this peculiar remedy. 2 t Being in their nature "quasi-criminal," awardable to the plaintiff in a civil case, but
for the purpose of punishing the defendant, they are truly neither
fish nor fowl. 22 As such, they do present a significant risk of confusing the trial of all the issues in the case, as the Alsop-Herr article
points out. Yet, as Messrs. Haugen and Larson indicate, such
damages have long been sanctioned by the courts of Minnesota
and most other states, and in 1978 received at least passive legislative approval. Their entrenched and growing role in private litigation derives very simply from the fact that sometimes the civil
law needs more than compensatory damages to serve as an adequate response to harmful behavior which is highly disrespectful of
other persons' rights.
I tend to agree with Messrs. Larson and Wattson's assumption
that punitive damages probably do not in fact deter gross misconduct very much at all. Our perspectives are quite different, however, on the Ford Pinto litigation 23 to which he refers. While I
agree that the automotive industry has probably not been much
deterred by the Pinto litigation, I believe that the failure of deterrence here arises principally out of the difficulty of comprehending
the nature of the proscribed misconduct. 24 The problem disappears, of course, if one facilely concludes that the product was in
fact, and obviously, dangerously "defective," as does Mr. Larson
in referring to G.M.'s "X" cars, and inferentially to the Ford
Pinto. I do not know if anyone has calculated the financial losses
to Ford from selling the Pinto-in terms of litigation costs (and
payouts) on compensatory claims alone, and most of all on the
damage to public confidence in the company, and the resulting
damage to market share. My hunch is that such losses have exceeded a billion dollars, perhaps substantially.
Corporate managers at Ford and General Motors are all too
well aware today of the close to catastrophic 25 costs of massive litigation resulting from the sale to the public of hundreds of
21. See Punitive Damages, supra note 7, at 1263 n.22, 1267. See generally Symposium, supra
note 1.
22. Yet punitive damages may give rise to both fish and fowl, for a plaintiff's lawyer
may go after such damages like a shark, and the defendant's lawyer may then turn
chicken.
23. See generally Problems, supra note 7.
24. See id. at 20-28, 36-38.
25. The result may be completely catastrophic for the company, as most notably (butnot exclusively) in the case of the Johns-Manville asbestos litigation.
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thousands (or even millions) of products that are found to be defective. One might plausibly assume that these risks alone would
give such managers about as much incentive (short, perhaps, of
criminal sanctions) as the law can provide. It seems naive to me,
to say the least, to conclude that any rational enterprise would sell
over a million products known to contain a dangerous defect that
threatened life. If I am wrong, and if a major corporation such as
General Motors were proven in fact to have sold the public more
than a million cars knowing they contained dangerously defective
brakes, 26 then surely punitive damages in large amounts would be
entirely appropriate. Not having seen the evidence, I simply cannot believe that General Motors is run by such simple fools, unaware of the devastating effects such a choice would have upon the
company-and their own careers-totally apart from punitive
damages. I therefore think that punitive damages, for most manufacturers and in most contexts, are an ineffective, superfluous
deterrent.
This is not to say, however, that punitive damages serve no useful purpose in products liability or other litigation. First, I believe
that there probably is some modest deterrent effect on some persons when they hear of a large punitive damages assessment
against another person in a similar situation. More significantly, I
believe that the actual and symbolic punishment 2 7 and law enforcement 28 effects of such awards are valid social objectives in a
civilized society. That is, both the victim and the law-abiding
members of society may fairly demand that a person proven 29 to
have deliberately stolen 30 another person's rights-to bodily safety,
mental equanimity, or financial security-be made to suffer, in order to restore the balance in the social compact broken by the
theft. Moreover, a very important compensatory function that
only the Alsop-Herr article mentions, and it derisively, is the payment of the plaintiff's attorney's fees. Whatever the merit (vel
26. These are in fact the allegations in the administrative civil penalty action now in
progress against General Motors in connection with its "X" cars. See GM Witness Says
NHTSA Consumer Complaints Shed No Light On Cause of Spin-Out Incidents, 12 PROD. SAFETY &
LIAB. REP. (BNA) 857 (Nov. 2, 1984).
27. See generally Ellis, supra note 20, at 4-8 (analyzing punishment as implying a notion
of desert); Punitve Damages, supra note 7, at 1279-82.
28. See generally Ellis, supra note 20, at 10; Punitive Damages, supra note 7, at 1287-95.
29. It is important that plaintiffs be required to prove their punitive damages claims
by clear and convincing evidence because of the quasi-criminal nature of this form of civil
fine. See Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 103, 119 (1982).
30. This notion is explained in Owen, supra note 29, at 109-11.
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non) in typical litigation of the "American rule," requiring each
party to bear his own expenses of prosecuting or defending litigation, surely the victim of a "theft" should be entitled to recover all
3
the costs of maintaining a restitution action against the thief. 1
And so I believe that punitive damages, although perhaps a poor
32
deterrent, serve other important social goals.

IV.
But the determination of whether the defendant's conduct was
culpable enough to warrant punitive damages, that is, whether it
showed a "flagrant

'33

or "willful indifference to the rights or safety

of others," is often a formidable task in an individual case. Perhaps even more difficult is the determination of an appropriate
amount for such damages, once liability is appropriately assessed.
As a result, there is a compelling need for close judicial control
over all aspects of such claims-as outlined in the Alsop-Herr article, as mandated by the Minnesota Supreme Court,34 as reflected
31. See id,"Puntive Damages, supra note 7, at 1295-99. While punitive damages awards
only occasionally approximate the costs of a plaintiffs lawyer and expenses of litigation,
such damages do nevertheless serve this function, even if only roughly so. Ideally, such
costs-perhaps with some form of a premium-should be legislatively prescribed upon
clear and convincing proof that the tort was committed with willful indifference to the
plaintiff's rights.
32. It is important to realize that the goals of punitive damages are not open-ended,
but that they instead have logical stopping places, even where a defendant's conduct has
been proven wrongful in the extreme. Thus, once a plaintiff's non-recoverable damages
have been fully met, the compensatory goal of punitive damages itself is achieved in full.
The punitive damages goals of punishment and deterrence may be partially or even fully
met in certain cases by the costs of paying compensatory damages (and related litigation
costs), particularly if the defendant must defend against many claims arising out of the
same misconduct.
Finally, at least from a tort perspective, the compensatory damages objective of providing injured plaintiffs with compensation that is deserved should take precedence over
the punitive damages goals, if the two conflict. In the mass tort context, for example, if
the defendant's bankruptcy is truly threatened (or actually caused) by the litigation, a
court should pause before allowing the jury to assess punitive damages, at least in a large
amount.
Where strict liability for compensatory damages imposes adequate punishment,
as it does in this type of case [asbestos litigation], we decline to cleave to a judgemade remedy of punitive damages that would both fail in its own purpose and
obstruct the broader objectives of the underlying cause of action which the plaintiff has chosen to pursue.
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 530 (5th Cir. 1984), question certt/iedto
the Mi sssipi Supreme Court, 750 F.2d 1314, 1328-29 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
33. " 'Flagrant' implies an objective standard apart from the actor and indicates that,
typically, only extreme departures from the norm, from accepted and acceptable safety
practices and engineering choices, will subject the manufacturer to punishment."
Problems, supia note 7, at 24 (footnotes omitted).
34. Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 229.
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in (and very probably the central goal behind) Minnesota's 1978
36
punitive damages statute, 35 and as urged by many commentators
37
and courts in other jurisdictions.
Perhaps the single most important aspect of a punitive damages
case demanding strict judicial control involves the review-by trial
and appellate courts-of the amount of such awards. In the absence of quite specific statutory rules of measurement for such
awards, 38 there is always a substantial risk that a jury outraged
enough to return such a verdict at all will assess an excessive
award. The legislative guidelines on measurement 39 should help
both the jury and the judge at trial, in properly measuring such
damages, and the reviewing courts on appeal. But it is the courts
in the final analysis, and not the juries, which must determine how
much punishment is too much, 40 and when it it not deserved at
4
all. '

V.
The common law of punitive damages in Minnesota has developed over the years fairly typically compared to other states. The
courts of this state, however, have shown a more sophisticated appreciation both for the importance of such damages in proper con35. MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1982).
36. See generally Sales, The Emergence of Punitive Damages in Product Liability Actions: A
FurtherAssault on the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY'S L. REv. 351, 401-02 (1983); Seltzer, supra note
7, at 89; Problems, supra note 7, at 50-59; Symposium, supra note 1. Various control procedures may be constitutionally required. See Wheeler, The ConstitutionalCase for Reforming
Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983).
37. See, e.g., Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717"F.2d 828, 839 (3d Cir. 1983) (Becker, J.);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 461 (1980) (Abrahamson,
J.); Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 427 N.E.2d 608, 617 (1981)
(Londrigan, J.).
38. Such damages could be limited to some multiple of compensatory damages; or
they could be subject to some absolute maximum cap, or perhaps to a minimum floor; or
they could be subject to some combination of these and other measurement requirements.
Further statutory refinement along these lines, defining the boundaries for determining
the proper amounts of punitive damages awards, could do much to cure many problems
of administration.
39. See MINN. STAT § 549.20, subd. 3 (1982). I believe these were derived in part
from the guidelines proposed in Punitive Damages, supra note 7, at 1319.
40. And so to order remittitur accordingly, or a new trial conditioned thereon. See
Problems, supra note 7, at 58.
41. And so, before or at the trial, to grant judgment on the merits for the defendant
on the punitive damages claim; on appeal, to reverse the punitive damages verdict, and
the compensatory verdict as well if the contaminating influence of the evidence, argument, and instructions on the punitive claim permeated the entire case. See Problems, supra
note 7, at 56-58.
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texts42 and for the need to define carefully the limits of such
damages through strong judicial control. 43 The punitive damages
statute enacted in 1978 provides a helpful structure which should
facilitate the principled adjudication of punitive damages claims.
Each of the articles in this Symposium should help enlighten the
bench and bar of Minnesota on many of the issues peculiar to the
litigation of these claims, should focus a variety of issues for debate, and should so enhance the further maturity of punitive damages jurisprudence.

42. See Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied sub nor.
Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921 (1980) (punitive damages appropriate in products liability action).
43. See Ezsert, 314 N.W.2d at 229 (punitive damages inappropriate in strict liability in
tort property loss action). The Eisert court's refusal to allow punitive damages on the facts
of that case may well reflect the court's fair perception that the case as presented was more
in the nature of a contractual breach of warranty case-in which such damages would be
inappropriate-than a "true" tort suit for property damage. From this perspective, the
case was correctly decided, for all the good reasons that courts have adamantly refused
such damages in contract actions. It is widely agreed that punitive damages are simply
out of place in ordinary commercial frustration cases. See generally RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 342 (1932); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1077 (1964).

